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Poverty and conflict are widely understood to be closely interconnected; 
with poverty making countries more prone to civil war, and armed conflict 
weakening governance and economic performance, thus increasing the risk 
of conflict relapse (Goodhand 2001). The selected readings in this pack 
move beyond reductive and harmful assumptions about ‘pathologies’ of 
poverty to examine the latest research into the poverty-conflict nexus. 
Earlier studies identified macro-level factors that made countries more 
likely to experience armed conflict. For example, low per capita income 
and large populations correlate with civil war, whereas ethnic and religious 
diversity does not make countries more prone to conflict (Fearon & Laitin 
2003). Newer research examines the processes and mechanisms that 
precipitate and shape violence on the ground.  
At the state level, poverty can lower resilience to conflict by weakening 
government institutions, stripping capacity for public goods provision, and 
limiting the projection of power and authority, whether soft or coercive. 
Poverty also compounds vulnerability to insurgency at the individual and 
community level by lowering the opportunity cost of mobilising for 
violence. High rates of unemployment and inequality, combined with low 
levels of education and development, are thought to soften the ground for 
recruitment and provide motives to fight (Humphreys & Weinstein 2008).1  
These individual correlates of poverty often follow systematic patterns that 
lead to ‘horizontal inequalities’. Horizontal inequalities occur when 
members of ethnic, religious, or other identity groups have unequal access 
to public goods, opportunities and resources. Group-level inequalities can 
generate social and economic polarisation that increases the risk of violent 
conflict (Østby 2008; Stewart 2009).  
Of course, these dynamics alone do not start wars. Political grievances and 
conflict proneness are most likely to lead to violence—from terrorism to 
civil war—when poverty and inequality combine with repression, 
particularly in anocracies, regimes that are neither strongly democratic, 
nor wholly autocratic (Abadie 2004; Mousseau et al. 2003). Yet, 
                                                          
1 See also the GSDRC Reading Pack on ‘Jobs, unemployment, and violence’: 
http://www.gsdrc.org/professional-dev/jobs-unemployment-and-violence/. 
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governance can also mitigate the link between poverty and conflict. Resource governance plays a 
key role in shaping countries’ economic and structural vulnerability to conflict (Ross 2004; Thies 
2010). While social welfare spending, particularly on education and healthcare, and stable aid flows 
reduce the risk of war, aid shocks and excessive military spending increase its likelihood (De Ree & 
Nillesen 2009; Nielsen et al. 2011; Savun & Tirone 2011; Taydas & Peksen 2012). Similarly, economic 
shocks, such as the 2008 spike in global food prices, can spark social unrest that escalates into armed 
conflict in vulnerable political settings (Blattman & Miguel 2010; Lagi et al. 2011).  
Once conflict breaks out, it hits the poor the hardest: social welfare is depleted as goods and services 
are diverted to the war effort; rural infrastructure is destroyed in contested territory; and justice and 
security provision retracts into urban areas and elite enclaves. Conflict causes and compounds 
poverty. First depleting labour and human capital, then destroying productive assets and financial 
capital, and finally, eroding the social capital of trust and cooperation upon which strong political 
and economic systems depend (Mercier et al. 2016). The war economies and institutions that are 
created in conflict are overwhelmingly extractive, and tend to warp local political economies through 
their reliance on smuggling and coercion (Keen 1997). These practices can become conflict drivers in 
their own right, and can perpetuate conflict-related violence and inequality even after war has 
officially ended (Justino 2013). 
Our understanding of the effects of conflict over time is still nascent. Evidence from Burundi 
suggests that households exposed to violence at the local level are more likely to face long-term 
poverty and deprivation than those who were spared. Exposure to violence also hurts those who 
participate in armed groups, as they have to overcome an education deficit, social stigma, and 
psychological distress that can leave them economically alienated and socially marginalised (Annan 
et al. 2011). At the country-level, this leads to what some call the ‘conflict trap’ (Hegre et al. 2011). 
The strongest predictor of civil war onset is whether a country has recently experienced civil war, 
with harmful ‘neighbourhood effects’ making surrounding countries similarly vulnerable to conflict 
spillover. However, vicious cycles of conflict that exacerbate poverty, slow economic growth, 
destabilise weak institutions and lead to violent relapse are not inevitable. The international 
response to post-conflict reconstruction can support a potential ‘phoenix effect’ of strengthened 
economic growth, where infrastructure development, debt relief and foreign aid, and currency 
stabilisation help to generate private investment (Addison et al. 2001; Kang & Meernik 2005). More 
importantly, local communities have proven remarkably resilient in rebuilding trust, social cohesion 
and civic engagement after war ends (Bellows & Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Gilligan et al. 2014; 
Voors et al. 2012). 
Key readings  
Reading 1: Hegre, H., Nygård, H.M., Strand, H., Gates, S., & Flaten, R.D. (2011). The conflict trap. 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, September 2011. 
http://folk.uio.no/hahegre/Papers/ConflictTrapPaper.pdf 
This paper provides a valuable introduction to the processes that can lock countries into cycles of 
poverty and de-development through armed conflict. Although the modelling is technical, it provides 
a straightforward overview of several key theories and variables in conflict studies (pp. 6-14), and 
demonstrates the importance of time, conflict intensity, and conflict spillover in shaping short- and 
long-term effects of war. 
Reading 2: Østby, G. (2008). Inequalities, the political environment and civil conflict: evidence from 
55 developing countries. In: Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict (ed. F. Stewart). Basingstoke: 
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Palgrave Macmillan UK. http://www.gsdrc.org/document-library/horizontal-inequalities-the-political-
environment-and-civil-conflict-evidence-from-55-developing-countries/ 
Building on research led by Frances Stewart (see further reading), Østby’s article shows that 
inequalities between identity groups, are more likely to lead to conflict than individuals in society. 
She provides an important data-driven response to earlier studies that found no correlation between 
conflict and ethnic/religious diversity, or inequality. 
Reading 3: Humphreys, M., & Weinstein, J. M. (2008). Who fights? The determinants of participation 
in civil war. American Journal of Political Science 52(2), 436-455. 
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic741392.files/CivilWar.pdf 
This survey of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone illustrates fighters’ multidimensional motives for 
participating in conflict. It shows that insurgents and counter-insurgents often have similar profiles 
including poverty, lack of education, and political alienation. Although it takes a rationalist approach, 
the article hints at new directions mobilisation research is taking: examining the role of coercion and 
insecurity, social networks, and variation in recruitment strategies. 
Reading 4: Taydas, Z., & Peksen, D. (2012). Can states buy peace? Social welfare spending and civil 
conflicts. Journal of Peace Research 49(2), 273-287. 
http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/49/2/273.full.pdf+  
This article shows that redistributive social policies, particularly for public goods like health and 
education, can have a strong pacifying effect while also improving economic equality. 
Reading 5: Mercier, M., Ngenzebuke, R. L., & Verwimp, P. (2016). Violence exposure and welfare 
over time: Evidence from the Burundi civil war. HiCN Working Paper 198. Brighton, UK: Households in 
Conflict Network, Institute of Development Studies.  
http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/HiCN-WP-1981.pdf 
This analysis illustrates how shifting conflict dynamics affect victims’ vulnerability and resilience. It 
shows that conflict can cause or compound poverty at the household level, and also that education 
and non-agricultural livelihoods can help households move out of poverty. Expect to see more 
mixed-methods research on how poverty and conflict shift over time, affecting individuals, 
households, and communities. 
Reading 6: Annan, J., Blattman, C., Mazurana, D., & Carlson, K. (2011). Civil war, reintegration, and 
gender in Northern Uganda. Journal of Conflict Resolution 55(6), 877-908. 
http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.CivilWarReintegrationGender.JCR.pdf 
This article highlights how gender, age, and varying conflict experiences affect post-conflict 
trajectories for armed group participants. It examines individual outcomes, including the 
psychological trauma of war, social exclusion, and lost educational and economic opportunities. 
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Background Reading: Goodhand, J. (2001) Violent conflict, poverty, and chronic poverty. CPRC 
Working Paper 6. London: Chronic Poverty Research Centre, ODI. 
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/WP06_Goodhand.pdf 
For those new to studies of poverty and conflict, Goodhand provides a useful primer to key 
concepts, as well as an overview of the international policy discourse in 2000. 
Questions to guide reading 
1. Why are poor countries more conflict-prone? 
2. Is it poverty or inequality that leads to conflict? 
3. In what ways are poor people more vulnerable to conflict-related violence?  
4. How do gender, age, and other factors shape people’s experiences of poverty and conflict? 
5. What are the short-term and long-term effects of conflict on economic, human, and social 
capital? 
6. Is there a poverty-conflict trap? If so, how can it be broken? 
Further reading 
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“post-conflict” economies. UNU/WIDER Discussion Paper 2001/90. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER. 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6484109.pdf 
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Political Science Review, 103(02), 231-247.  
http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2009.V2V.APSR.pdf 
Blattman, C., & Miguel, E. (2010). Civil war. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 3-57. 
http://chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2010.CivilWar.JEL.pdf 
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http://www.mit.edu/~rnielsen/Nielsen%20et%20al%202011.pdf 
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Ross, M. L. (2004). What do we know about natural resources and civil war?. Journal of Peace 
Research, 41(3), 337-356. 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Michael_Ross11/publication/248418789_What_Do_We_Know_about_
Natural_Resources_and_Civil_War/links/0f31752d9575c1499d000000.pdf 
Savun, B., & Tirone, D. C. (2011). Foreign aid, democratization, and civil conflict: how does 
democracy aid affect civil conflict?. American Journal of Political Science 55(2), 233-246. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1456753 
Stewart, F. (2009). Horizontal inequalities as a cause of conflict. Bradford Development Lecture, 
University of Bradford, November 2009.  
http://www.bradford.ac.uk/social-sciences/media/socialsciences/BDLStewart.pdf 
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